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1. A black swan is an unpredictable event that is beyond what is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe consequences. Black swan  
events are characterized by their extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they were obvious in hindsight. – Investopedia 
2. Our World in Data, 2021
3. Department of Health, 2021
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COVID-19 HOTEL QUARANTINE 
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Walter de Ruyter
In his first essay for our Journal, 
Walter de Ruyter explains how 
antifragility can inform a framework 
for better management of ‘black swan’ 
events,1 and explores the influence of 
groupthink in Victoria's initial handling 
of the COVID-19 crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Australia initiated a nationwide response through 
its States and Territories to contain and mitigate the 
impact of COVID-19 on the Australian population. 
From a global perspective, Australia has been a 
leader in managing the COVID-19 pandemic.2 
However, the different approaches taken by 
States and Territories mean that some states 
have experienced the impacts of the pandemic 
differently. The State of Victoria faced more 
significant challenges in its containment strategies, 
with cumulative data as of 15 March 20213 showing 
that 90.2% (820 out of 909) of all COVID-related 
deaths across Australia occurred in Victoria. 
Victoria’s management of hotel quarantine was a 
key containment strategy. Particularly heartbreaking 
for Australians is that many of the COVID-related 
deaths in Victoria were predominantly in private  
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or not-for-profit aged care facilities.4 In response 
to the issues arising from hotel quarantine, the 
Victorian Government established a COVID-19 
Hotel Quarantine Inquiry, with its final report 
released in December 2020.5 
From an international perspective, the overall 
morbidity and mortality numbers are small in 
Australia. What is unique from a nation and 
state perspectives is the significant morbidity and 
mortality between Victoria and other Australian 
States and Territories. The Inquiry report allows 
for assessing contributing factors to inform future 
practice both within Australia and elsewhere. The 
following is a short commentary of the Victorian 
Government’s report on hotel quarantine used  
as a critical containment strategy for COVID-19.  
It adopts an antifragility perspective to examine 
how the Victorian Government’s approach became 
subject to groupthink before demonstrating how 
organisational practice can overcome fragility to 
build resilience.
CASE STUDY 
Much has been written about the breakdowns of 
the Victorian Government’s adoption of a hotel 
quarantine system for repatriating Australians during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. There is no denying that 
the task confronting the State Government, to 
develop from scratch a state-wide hotel quarantine 
system, was enormous: ‘The lack of a plan for 
mandatory mass quarantining meant that the 
Hotel Quarantine Program was conceived and 
implemented ‘from scratch’ to be operational  
within 36 hours from concept to operation’.6 
The illustrative case study outlined here serves to 
connect the events of the hotel quarantine review. 
It gives examples of what did not work well in 
implementing hotel quarantine in Victoria, applying 
the lens of antifragility and groupthink. Antifragility 
is a process in which stressors are information 
used to manage the risk arising from rapid change 
effectively. Nassim Nicholas Taleb presented the 
concept in his 2012 book Antifragile: Things That 
Gain From Disorder.7 As highlighted by Irving Janis,8 
groupthink arises where the desire for consensus 
amongst critical stakeholders overrides their ability 
to evaluate alternatives objectively.9 Groupthink 
requires individuals to avoid raising controversial 
issues or alternative solutions, and there is a loss of 
individual creativity, uniqueness and independent 
thinking. That groupthink may have prevailed in the 
development of Victoria’s hotel quarantine system 
emerges from one of the Inquiry’s findings: ‘While 
there was a range of plans in place .. . none of those 
plans contemplated the mandatory mass quarantine 
of people in response to a Class 2 emergency.’ 
Further, we consider establishing an approach 
to capture tribal knowledge in conjunction with 
a buyer-seller model to address groupthink and 
support organisations in becoming antifragile. Tribal 
knowledge is any unwritten information that is not 
commonly known by others within a company. 
This term used most when referencing information 
that may need to be known by others to produce 
quality products or services.10 A buyer-seller model 
complements a closer move to insights made by 
frontline staff informing strategy. The objective is to 
convert insights from the client-provider relationship 
into commercial reality, allowing the organisation to 
respond earlier to an environment of rapid change.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1, 2021 85




14. Australia’s National Cabinet was established on 13 March 2020 to address and ensure consistency in Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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BACKGROUND
Danco11 described the relationship between fragile, 
robust and Antifragile in organisations as depicted  




STRESSORS IMPACTING  
THE ORGANISATION
Fragile The impact of stress creates 
uncertainty
Robust Impact of stress is Indifferent
Antifragility Impact of stressors resolve 
uncertainty (stressors are 
information to be acted upon)
Adapted from Danko, 2020a
According to Taleb,12 antifragility is based on 
the idea that ‘Everything gains or loses from 
volatility. Fragility is what loses from volatility and 
uncertainty’. Whilst antifragility gains from volatility 
and uncertainty, in antifragile systems, stressors 
are information.13 In a ‘black swan event’ such as 
COVID-19, conventions (the way something is 
usually done) around practice struggle to effectively 
respond to the event’s scale, as they govern a 
specific set of organisational parameters to operate. 
To respond in scale requires re-imagining those 
parameters, which may mean establishing seamless 
communication across response agencies. The 
Australian Government learned this lesson in 
establishing a national cabinet on 13 March 2020.14 
Similarly, at a state level, the NSW Government 
established a whole-of-government response to 
black swan events in its creation of a government 
agency called Resilience NSW on 6 April 2020. 
More recently, with the release of the new  
Federal Budget on 11 May 2021, the Australian 
Government announced the establishment of 
the National Recovery and Resilience Agency, 
with a budget of $600 million to support local 
communities during the relief and recovery  
phases following major disasters.15 
An often overlooked aspect of groupthink is  
the conventions reflected in practice habits.  
Both formal and informal conventions act as filters.  
The outcome is that stressors on established 
practice have to be relatively large before the 
organisation reacts, resulting in a lag effect. If the 
event is significant in scale, such as a black swan,  
the impact of a lag effect increases uncertainty. 
Viewed in the context of COVID-19, a lag effect  
in responding compounds scale such as infection 
rates. Concerning Victorian hotel quarantine, 
the following quote from the Inquiry reveals that 
conventions created this lag effect in dealing with 
the COVID-19 crisis:
‘ ... Just as the [Victorian] Department of 
Health and Human Services did not see itself 
as the control agency responsible for the 
Program, it did not see itself as “in charge” 
on-site. This left brewing the disaster that 
tragically came to be. This complex and 
high-risk environment was left without the 
control agency taking its leadership role, 
which included the need to provide on-site 
supervision and management. This should 
have been seen as essential to an inherently 
dangerous environment. That such a situation 
developed and was not apparent as a danger 
until after the two outbreaks, tragically 
illustrated the lack of proper leadership  
and oversight, and the perils this created.’16 
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The Victorian Government response 
was challenging as, like many plans where 
communication is promoted as open and working  
in unison, it was, in reality, centric and siloed.  
As an analogy, many organisations are currently 
structured like a box of round pencils. Each pencil 
contacts the other across four points with a lot  
of separation space. That separation space is  
where strategic emergency plans sit and only  
realise their potential when pressure-tested  
by the event’s reality. For example:
‘ Both the State and Commonwealth 
governments were aware, prior to 2020,  
of the possibility of a pandemic and its 
potentially devastating consequences. 
However, none of the existing Commonwealth 
or State pandemic plans contained plans  
for mandatory, mass quarantine. Indeed,  
the concept of hotel quarantine was 
considered problematic and, thus, no plans 
for mandatory quarantine existed in the 
Commonwealth’s overarching plans for  
dealing with pandemic influenza.’17 
Another area for consideration is optionality: 
‘ ... which is a precondition to Antifragility, but 
just because you have options doesn’t mean 
you’re Antifragile. A fragile organisation, 
facing an unknown stressor, may have plenty 
of “options” available to them. But if you 
don’t know what to do with those options, 
and if you don’t know how to grow into the 
challenge, then those options don’t do you  
any good.’18 
The impact of several options being overseen by 
a disjointed governance structure and practice 
not designed for scale such as a black swan event 
resulted in a situation where: 
‘ ... Inside the DHHS internal governance 
structures, there was not an agreed view  
or consistent understanding between 
emergency management executives and the 
public health senior members as to who was 
fulfilling what functions and roles, and who 
was reporting to whom. In the context of the 
operation of the Hotel Quarantine Program, 
this created confusion and fragmentation  
in governance structures and, apparently, 
tension and frustration.’19 
The inverse pyramid depicted in Figure 1 links 
to Fayol’s Bridge.20 Henri Fayol proposed that 
subordinate employees should be allowed to 
communicate directly with each other, given that 
their superiors had agreed upon this procedure. 
This principle became known under Fayol’s Bridge, 
which conceptualises decision making in a stream 
matrix model where decisions are made as close 
as possible to the client-provider interface with 
appropriate delegations for decision-making. 
The model of Fayol’s Bridge is evident in the 
structure of Resilience NSW, where subordinate 
decentralised agencies communicate directly with 
each other, fast-tracking intelligence upward to 
government decision-makers. A key success factor 
in how the NSW Government has successfully 
managed COVID-19. Compared to Victoria, 
Resilience NSW derived increased efficiency 
through rapid and informed decision making  
from a more decentralised government in  
New South Wales.
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FIGURE 1: CAPTURING TRIBAL KNOWLEDGE TO SUPPORT ANTIFRAGILITY STRATEGIES
To effectively communicate important information which gives direction to practice,  
within peoples work domains under the auspice of a subject matter expert  

























































conversation & insight capture across business
as supported by a Buyer & Seller model 
which incentivizes entrepreneurship
EMPLOYEE SPAN OF CONTROL
Management & 
Employee Driven
Siloed organisations tend to filter out small and 
manageable stressors. However, these are likely  
to accumulate and become significant problems  
in black swan events. 
According to Danco, ‘The only way you can feasibly 
do this is for disorder detection and response  
to take place at a small enough resolution, and  
tight enough turnaround time’. Such a response  
is granular dynamic, and low cost. Response at  
a macro level often is, ‘Top-down systems have  
a hard time with antifragility because for them,  
all options are costly’.21 
Danco’s description is reflective of the Victorian 
Government’s centralised structure: 
‘ Accordingly, Antifragile systems and  
organisms lean towards a common theme: 
bottoms-up decision-making, rather than  
top-down decision making. Antifragility 
requires real options, and real options are 
low-cost. Antifragility is only successful if 
you can actually detect, react, and grow in 
response to deviations from your present 
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TABLE 2
 Barriers (e.g., Skin) It’s just a dumb wall (but  
it works most of the time)
Fragile Barriers are akin to ‘conventions’, 
prevalent in business which act as a  
guide when responding to known and 
everyday issues.
Innate Immunity Good at catching threats,  
but must know about  
them in advance
Robust Innate immunity is evident in strategic 
plans and the quality systems of the 
organisation. Their designed response  
is reactive to a perceived horizon or  
an immediate issue.
Adaptive Immunity Stressors are information; 
exposure creates the response
Antifragile Adaptive immunity is incorporating a 
dynamic process to capture insights from 
tribal knowledge which complement 
quality systems. Its design is to respond  
to the unplanned effectively.
Adapted from Danco.23 The fourth column links governance and knowledge management to adaptive immunity.
24. Ibid.
25. https://www.theceomagazine.com/business/innovation-technology/microsoft/ 
The analogy of ‘adaptive immunity’ as depicted in 
table 2 demonstrates variation in practice where 
the organisation’s health and resilience can be 
conceptualised in terms of our body’s immune 
system.24 In essence, how unplanned disorder is 
managed determines how organisations survive  
and prosper. 
Adaptive immunity practices can be proposed 
as a stepping stone for organisations to become 
antifragile and combat the negative impact of 
groupthink. The capture of tribal knowledge moves 
information derived from issues (often unplanned 
and unknown) to understanding and its application 
to better manage volatility by converting risk to 
opportunity. The process around tribal knowledge 
capture becomes embedded and in constant 
motion within the organisation’s governance 
structure. Tribal knowledge is an integral part of 
adaptive immunity, which sits between business 
continuity and resilience strategies for organisations. 
Effectively capturing tribal knowledge is a critical 
whilst often overlooked step in building resilience 
strategies within organisations. The recently 
released Microsoft Viva application25 is a step in this 
direction, although it still requires linkage points 
to hierarchy structures that continue to dominate 
corporate management. 
The analogy of the immune system and the role of antifragility is depicted in table 2.
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CONCLUSION
There has been much discussion in academic 
journals and the media about building resilience 
in organisational structures in response to 
changing markets where business models become 
unstable due to unforeseen circumstances, such as 
COVID-19. This paper uses the recent Victorian 
Inquiry into Hotel Quarantine to consider how 
antifragility may be a means to better manage 
unforeseen circumstances. It extends this to the 
analogy of adaptive immunity, a descriptor that is 
becoming more mainstream as a way of responding 
to unplanned change. Organisations are finding 
the analogy of adaptive immunity as an effective 
means of communicating the next step in becoming 
antifragile whilst overcoming the often unrecognised 
negative impact of groupthink. 
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